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American Express’s revenue growth slowed to roughly 10 percent in the second quarter, a step down from the 11 percent pace set in the first quarter and a hair below the near $19.7 billion analysts had penciled in. Placed against the year that preceded it, that deceleration reads less like a stumble than an overdue return to trend. Full year 2025 revenue rose 10 percent to $72.2 billion, net income reached $10.8 billion, and diluted earnings per share climbed to $15.38. The first quarter of 2026 extended that streak further, with revenue up 11 percent, net income rising 15 percent to $3.0 billion, and EPS jumping 18 percent to $4.28, comfortably ahead of what Wall Street had modeled. A company cannot outrun its own scale indefinitely, and the second quarter looks like the moment American Express met it.
The distinction matters because American Express does not trade like an ordinary card issuer. Its shares carry a premium built on the assumption that fee income, not transaction volume, will keep compounding faster than the broader consumer finance sector. A single percentage point of deceleration, however small in absolute terms, forces investors to ask whether that assumption still holds, or whether the company has simply run out of easy comparisons. The answer, on the evidence available so far, leans toward the former. Growth is slowing because the base has grown large, not because the customer has grown weaker.
The more revealing numbers sit below the top line, in the ledger that connects spending to profit, and the clearest detailed picture available still comes from the first quarter, the most recent period for which full figures have been disclosed. Expenses rose 11 percent to $13.9 billion, largely on the back of the U.S. Platinum Card refresh and heavier use of travel and lifestyle benefits, the kind of spending that signals engagement rather than distress. Provisions for credit losses rose only modestly, to $1.3 billion, and the net write-off rate actually improved, falling to 2.0 percent from 2.1 percent a year earlier. Few consumer lenders can claim that credit quality is improving while the loan book keeps expanding. American Express can, and it has built much of its investor case around that fact.
That combination, expenses climbing in step with revenue while defaults recede, is the quiet mechanism behind the company’s resilience through past downturns, and it frames the real question for the second half of the year. That question is not whether revenue growth slows further, since it almost certainly will as comparisons get harder, but whether the additional marketing and technology spending management committed to in April begins compressing margins faster than fee income can offset. A deceleration paired with disciplined costs is a manageable story. A deceleration paired with rising expenses and rising write-offs would be a different one entirely, and nothing in the second quarter’s early detail points that way yet.
What distinguishes American Express from most of its rivals is not the card itself but everything built around it, and the second quarter added three more entries to that list. A refreshed partnership with Delta Air Lines updated the SkyMiles card lineup at no added cost to members. A proposed acquisition of TheFork would deepen the company’s foothold in European dining. A new global alliance with Accor’s ALL loyalty program extended elite status matching across another continent.
These moves extended a pattern already visible in the first quarter, when the company became the official payments partner of the NFL and extended its long running relationship with the NBA, deals designed less to sell cards directly than to keep the brand embedded in the cultural life of its wealthiest customers. It also introduced the Amex Agentic Commerce Experiences developer kit alongside an Agent Purchase Protection feature, an early wager that the next generation of shopping will run through AI agents rather than browser tabs, and that American Express intends to be the payment rail those agents reach for first.
None of these moves shows up cleanly in a single quarter’s revenue line, but together they explain how net card fee revenue has managed double digit growth for thirty consecutive quarters. That streak, more than any single earnings print, is the asset investors are actually pricing when they pay up for this stock.
The market’s positioning ahead of the release told its own story. Shares closed at $340.84 the day before earnings, down 2.3 percent on the session, before recovering slightly in after hours trading. Options pricing implied a swing of roughly 3.5 percent in either direction, a modest band for a stock that has occasionally moved far more sharply on earnings day. What stood out more than the price action was the direction of analyst revisions in the weeks leading up to the report. JPMorgan upgraded the stock to overweight and lifted its price target to $400 from $328, arguing that a customer base skewed toward high income households is relatively insulated from the macroeconomic strain weighing on lower income spenders. UBS, Bank of America, TD Cowen, HSBC, and Evercore ISI all raised their targets in the same window, even where their underlying ratings stayed neutral.
A consensus target near $372, against roughly fourteen buy ratings and a single sell, suggests a Street that expected exactly the kind of quarter American Express appears to have delivered: solid, unspectacular, and comfortably within guidance. That is not the posture of investors bracing for disappointment. It is the posture of investors who had already priced in a slower quarter and simply wanted confirmation that the slowdown would stop there.
A second quarter growing near 10 percent sits comfortably inside the full year guidance of 9 to 10 percent revenue growth and earnings per share between $17.30 and $17.90 that management reaffirmed when it reported the first quarter, a decision it paired with higher marketing and technology spending rather than a pullback. That reads as confidence that demand, not cost control, remains the binding constraint on the business, and it is the least dramatic and most important conclusion an investor can draw from the numbers available so far.
The company’s own disclosures point to the risks that will matter more in the second half: a slowdown in global growth, the lingering effects of tariffs, and the ordinary pressure of asking merchants to keep accepting a premium card at a premium price. None of these are new threats, and American Express has managed each of them before. What remains is whether card fee growth and credit discipline can keep compounding at a pace that justifies a valuation built for years of double digit earnings expansion. The first quarter gave the company the benefit of the doubt. The second, once its full detail works through the filings, will say whether that benefit still stands.